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The fast-track registration policy of the Department of Health allows 
for rapid registration of new medicines of public health importance 
and of all medicines on the Essential Medicines List, most of which 
are generics. No limit is placed on the number of generic brands 
of a medicine that can be submitted for fast-track registration. 
This, together with resource constraints at the regulator, may delay 
access to important new medicines, new fixed-dose combinations 
of critical medicines or affordable versions of biological medicines 
(biosimilars). One reason for not limiting the number of fast-track 
generic applications was to promote price competition among generic 
brands. We found this not to be valid, since market share correlated 
poorly with price. Generic brands with high market share were, 
mostly, those that were registered first. We propose that the number 
of generic brands accepted for fast-tracking be limited to not more 
than seven per medicine.
In a recently published paper of ours, we tested the widely held 
belief, particularly among those in the pharmaceutical industry, that 
the backlog in medicine registration applications at the Medicines 
Control Council (MCC) was a barrier to access to affordable generic 
medicines.[1] In the study, we investigated the availability of generic 
products of eight tracer medicines (amlodipine, ciprofloxacin, 
fluoxetine, lamivudine, metformin, oxytocin, rifampicin and 
simvastatin) that are commonly used in the treatment of the most 
prevalent diseases in South Africa (SA).[2] Availability was assessed 
based on the number of generic products for each tracer medicine 
that had been registered at the time of the study in 2012, as well as the 
number of generics that were being marketed. We found that for most 
of the tracer medicines, more generics had been registered than were 
being sold in the market. When data were aggregated, they showed 
that only 54% of all registered generic brands for the eight medicines 
were marketed, which suggests that the backlog was not a hindrance 
to access to these medicines. 
In 2003, the Department of Health implemented a fast-track 
registration policy, not only for new chemical entities (NCEs) 
considered essential for national health and which may not be on 
the Essential Medicines List (EML), but also for all medicines on 
the EML, the majority of which are generics.[3,4] We found that for 
the period between 2007 and 2012, more generic medicines were 
registered through expedited review (fast track) than NCEs.[1] Since 
no limit is placed on the number of generics of a particular medicine 
that can be fast-tracked, it is likely that several generic applications 
may be in the fast-track system when many generic products for such 
medicines have already been registered. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that the fast-track review process, which should lead to a registration 
decision timeline of not more than 9 months after first submission,[3] 
is now also taking considerably longer. Thus, a backlog is likely to 
be present, even in the expedited registration pathway. This, coupled 
with current shortcomings, such as insufficient skilled manpower 
and poor infrastructure at the MCC,[5] could prevent innovative 
as well as cost-effective and new fixed-dose combination (FDC) 
therapies from reaching patients timeously. 
According to the minutes of the Industry Task Group meeting 
held in March 2015,[6] the MCC has been allocating applications 
for review received from January until March 2012. This implies 
that the applications that make up the backlog are all those received 
up to December 2011 and which have not yet been reviewed. 
These applications will, thus, only be evaluated once the MCC has 
acquired substantial additional capacity to start reviewing backlog 
applications. 
A class of important and potentially cost-effective medicines that 
may be part of the backlog is biosimilar medicines. These are products 
that are similar, i.e. not identical, to innovator biopharmaceuticals of 
erythropoietin, filgrastim, growth hormone, infliximab, etc. that 
are produced by modern biotechnological methods and which are 
already off patent.[7] While many countries in the European Union, as 
well as Canada, Australia, Korea and even the USA, have registered 
such products, SA has yet to register its first biosimilar. Biosimilars 
are significantly cheaper than their innovator counterparts[8] and, 
consequently, more patients would have access to these medicines 
once they are registered. In Europe, biosimilars of somatropin, 
erythropoietin and filgrastim have been available since before 2010.[9] 
Considerable experience has, thus, already been gained with the use 
of these products, so that doubts about their safety and efficacy should 
no longer exist. The MCC should, therefore, alter its strategy for the 
allocation of applications for evaluation from using a specific date of 
submission such as January 2012 (as it currently does) to selecting 
product classes or types for which there is a public need, irrespective 
of when the applications of such products were submitted. 
The lack of restrictions on the use of the fast-track review system, 
such as placing a limit on the number of generics of a specific 
medicine that can be reviewed and registered via this process, can 
result in delays in the registration and availability of medicines of 
public health importance. In our previous study, we found that 
changes in the treatment guidelines for tuberculosis (TB) may have 
made some FDC products containing rifampicin obsolete, causing 
them not to be marketed. New FDC formulations, and even new 
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Table 1. Date of registration, single exit price per dosage unit and market share of selected tracer medicines as at December 2012. 
Names of registration holders for each product are included.
Active pharmaceutical 
ingredient 
(strength/dosage unit) Brand name
Date of registration
(YYYY/MM/DD) Holder of registration certificate
Price/unit
(ZAR)
Market share by 
volume (%)
Alendronate (70 mg/tablet) Osteobon 2005/07/29 Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd 45.60 44.4
Fosamax* 2002/03/26 MSD (Pty) Ltd 93.84 6.3
Osteonate 2010/11/26 Pharma Dynamics (Pty) Ltd 38.29 1.7
Fosagen 2006/02/17 Mylan (Pty) Ltd 52.54 0.9
Sandoz 
Alendronate
2006/12/01 Sandoz SA (Pty) Ltd 56.48 0.3
Amlodipine (10 mg/
tablet)
Amloc 2004/09/17 Pharma Dynamics (Pty) Ltd 3.61 37.8
Ciplavasc 2005/02/11 Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd 3.50 19.3
Lomanor 2005/09/23 Pfizer Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 3.08 10.0
Norvasc* 1991/11/26 Pfizer Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 6.71 4.6
Amlate 2006/08/11 Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 3.46 3.1
Ciprofloxacin (250 mg/
tablet)
Cifloc 2001/10/08 Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 1.31 21.6
Ciploxx 2003/01/24 Cipla Life Sciences (Pty) Ltd 1.25 17.3
Ciprobay* 1990/06/12 Bayer (Pty) Ltd 10.09 10.6
Austell 
Ciprofloxacin
2004/07/02 Austell Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 1.07 10.2
Ciprol 2004/07/23 Arrow Pharma South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1.19 6.4
Ciprogen 2003/09/05 Xixia Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd 1.39 5.8
Bio-Ciprofloxacin 2005/10/09 Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 0.97 4.5
Orpic 2002/09/20 Pharmacare Limited 1.26 2.9
Fluoxetine (20 mg/
capsule)
Nuzak 1998/05/25 Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd 1.22 45.7
Lorien 1996/03/27 Pharmacare Limited 1.18 24.0
Lilly-Fluoxetine 1995/10/25 Eli Lilly (Sa) (Pty) Ltd 3.88 11.7
Rezak 2003/03/07 Ranbaxy (SA) (Pty) Ltd 0.74 4.5
Ranflocs 2003/04/25 Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 0.70 4.3
A-Lennon 
Fluoxetine
2001/09/21 Zydus Healthcare S.A. (Pty) Ltd 0.76 2.3
Zydus-Fluoxetine 2005/06/03 Pharmacare Limited 0.74 2.2
Prohexal 2000/12/13 Sandoz SA (Pty) Ltd 1.23 1.9
Prozac* 1986/12/31 Eli Lilly (SA) (Pty) Ltd 14.24 1.2
Actor Fluoxetine 2003/03/07 Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd 1.14 1.0
Metformin (500 mg/
tablet)
Glucophage* 1975/04/25 Merck (Pty) Ltd 0.49 49.1
Mylan Metformin 2000/12/13 Sandoz SA (Pty) Ltd 0.34 14.4
Sandoz Metformin 1984/03/26 Mylan (Pty) Ltd 0.35 11.5
Arrow Metformin 2005/09/23 Arrow Pharma South Africa (Pty) Ltd 0.36 4.4
Metforal 2002/09/20 Adcock Ingram Limited 0.35 3.4
Metored 2008/08/15 Pharmaplan (Pty) Ltd 0.34 3.1
Accord Metformin 2009/12/04 Accord Healthcare (Pty) Ltd 0.32 2.6
Gluconorm 2007/10/05 Be-Tabs Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd 0.34 2.3
Austell Metformin 2005/09/23 Austell Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 0.36 1.8
Continued ...
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drugs for the prevention and treatment of multidrug-resistant TB, 
even if fast-tracked, could take significantly longer than the specified 
9 months expedited review and registration decision timeline. An 
example is an application for the registration of a generic version of 
linezolid that was submitted for fast-track review in May 2013 for 
the treatment of drug-resistant TB (DR-TB). When a final decision 
on the product was still outstanding more than 16 months after its 
submission, activists handed over a letter addressed to the Registrar 
of Medicines, signed by clinicians, civil society organisations and 
patients with DR-TB, demanding its immediate registration.[10] 
The product was eventually registered in November 2014 and a 
second one in March 2015. At least six other generic linezolid tablet 
formulations (600 mg/tablet), all submitted as fast-track applications, 
are currently under review. This raises an important issue that needs 
to be considered if the fast-track review process is to be amended 
to improve its effectiveness: what should be the number of generics 
of a specific medicine that are allowed to be fast-tracked, to ensure 
not only timeous availability but also affordability through robust 
competition? Should the additional six applications also have been 
allowed in the fast-track system, which, with the current limited 
number of evaluators, will take preference over other fast-track 
applications for medicines for which there may potentially be no 
alternatives, or if alternatives exist, may not be as effective as the new 
medicine? 
Table 1 gives the single exit price per dosage unit (i.e. tablet or 
capsule) for several brands of each of six tracer medicines, their 
percentage market share by volume and their date of registration. 
Whereas the price difference between the generic products and 
their corresponding innovator is substantial in almost all cases, the 
variation in price among generics of a specific medicine is often not 
as large. Exceptions include where the patent holder of the innovator 
markets a generic version of its own product (a clone or autogeneric) 
as is the case with the fluoxetine generic, Lilly-Fluoxetine which, 
although priced at only 27% of the cost of the innovator product, 
Prozac, was three times more expensive than the market leader 
(Nuzak). 
Another observation is that the market leader for a specific 
medicine is not necessarily the cheapest brand. In the case of 
the alendronate generics, for example, the cheapest product was 
Osteonate, which cost 16% less than the market leader, Osteobon. 
Yet, it only had a market share of 1.5%, whereas Osteobon had a 
market share of 44.6%. The higher market share was most likely due 
to earlier entry, since Osteobon was registered before Osteonate. 
In fact, for most of the other medicines in the sample, the market 
leader or its follower was registered first. An interesting observation 
was that one innovator product retained its dominant market 
position after generics entered. The metformin originator product, 
Glucophage, was still the market leader (at 49.1% market share) even 
though it was priced 35% higher than the cheapest generic (Accord 
Metformin with a market share of 2.6%) and 31% higher than the 
generic with the next highest market share (Mylan Metformin, with a 
market share of 14.4%). This price difference is similar to that found 
between the highest and lowest priced generics of some of the other 
tracer medicines. For example, for ciprofloxacin and alendronate, the 
difference in price between the most and least expensive generics 
was 40% and 48%, respectively. The price difference between the 
innovator and generic market leader for the other medicines ranged 
from 86% for amlodipine to 1067% for fluoxetine. Glucophage was 
thus priced at the same level as generics, which ensured its dominant 
market position. 
Competition theory predicts that as more competitors enter a 
market, prices of products will fall. Hence, registering a large number 
of generics should lower the cost of medicines, increasing their 
accessibility. Our data show, however, that increasing availability 
through registration of more generics does not necessarily lead to 
greater access, as measured by percentage market share, even if these 
newly registered generics are priced lower than those already in the 
market. Regression analysis further confirmed the weak relationship 
(R2<0.05) between price and market share (data not shown). This 
suggests that at the prevailing price level of generics, other factors 
are more important determinants of market share. One such factor 
is market entry, since among our sample of six medicines, the 
brands with the highest market share were among the first to obtain 
registration. 
The data above, although based on a small sample of medicines, 
suggest that the contention of promoting competition by registering 
several generic brands of a medicine to ensure low prices and, hence, 
affordability to the patient, may not be valid. Affordability appears 
to be a function more of the price difference between the innovator 
and generics as a group, which can be substantial (>80%), as this has 
Table 1.  (cont.) Date of registration, single exit price per dosage unit and market share of selected tracer medicines as at December 
2012. Names of registration holders for each product are included.
Active pharmaceutical 
ingredient 
(strength/dosage unit) Brand name
Date of registration
(YYYY/MM/DD) Holder of registration certificate
Price/unit
(ZAR)
Market share by 
volume (%)
Simvastatin
(20 mg/tablet)
Adco-Simvastatin 2002/09/20 Adcock Ingram Limited 1.02 58.3
Simvacor 2002/11/15 MC Pharma (Pty) Ltd 1.02 7.0
Cipla-Simvastatin 2006/10/06 Cipla Life Sciences (Pty) Ltd 0.97 6.9
Simvotin 2004/05/28 Ranbaxy (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1.10 5.8
Aspen Simvastatin 2005/07/29 Pharmacare Limited 1.10 5.4
Michol 2007/10/05 Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd 1.54 4.4
Zocor* 1990/04/02 MSD (Pty) Ltd 2.45 3.1
Arrow Simvastatin 2006/04/07 Arrow Pharma South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1.07 2.2
Choleste 2007/10/05 Be-Tabs Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd 1.07 1.4
Biovac Simvastatin 2006/12/01 Arrow Pharma South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1.07 0.9
* Innovator product.
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been shown to erode the market share of the innovator. Differences in 
prices among generic brands do not correlate with market share. What 
is far more important is market entry. Therefore, in the allocation 
of fast-track status to generic applications for a medicine that has 
gone off patent, the promotion of competition should not be a prime 
consideration, particularly in view of the capacity constraints at the 
MCC, i.e. the limited number of evaluators currently available. The fast-
track system should at all times be responsive and, consequently, must 
be reserved for new medicines, a novel formulation or combination of 
existing medicines based on new treatment guidelines, the first generic 
of an off patent medicine, or for unique biologicals such as vaccines and 
biotechnology products, including biosimilars.
Finally, medicines with small local markets for which there are few 
registered products and suppliers are vulnerable to stock-outs when 
suppliers decide to discontinue their products. Oxytocin is one such 
product, with only three registered brands, and which had a market 
value of ZAR24.9 million in 2012. This is considered small relative 
to that of other products such as amoxicillin (ZAR441.4 million), 
tenofovir (ZAR467.5 million), ibuprofen (ZAR498.4 million) and 
paracetamol (ZAR1.697 billion). The product is only used in the 
hospital setting and requires cold-chain storage. These factors probably 
discourage local companies from including oxytocin formulations in 
their product portfolio. A more recent case involves intravenous 
rifampicin, which was under threat from being discontinued by the 
only supplier for this product.[11,12] It is important, therefore, to ensure 
that the fast-track system is immediately accessible when applications 
for such market vulnerable products are received by the MCC.
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